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Abstract: In this paper we consider a Ramsey-type aggregate model with general
preferences and technology, endogenous labor and factor-specific productive external
effects arising from average capital and labor. First, we show that indeterminacy
cannot arise when there are only capital externalities but that it does when there are
only labor external effects. Second, we prove that only the additively-separable and
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1 Introduction
Since the seminal contribution of Benhabib and Farmer [2], the existence of
local indeterminacy and sunspot fluctuations based on self-fulfilling expec-
tations has been widely studied within aggregate Ramsey-type models with
externalities. The success of this literature is mainly based on the fact that
by focussing on business cycle fluctuations derived from shocks on expec-
tations, it provides an alternative explanation of macroeconomic volatility
and instability to the standard real business cycle approach which is based
on the consideration of real shocks on the fundamentals.
Over the last 10 years, the main effort has been devoted to finding plausi-
ble conditions on the main parameters to get local indeterminacy. In partic-
ular, following the empirical evidences provided by Basu and Fernald [1], de-
creasing the amount of externalities needed to produce sunspot fluctuations
has been a driving force for most of the recent papers. Although a num-
ber of important contributions has been produced, the main message of this
literature remains unclear as many different specifications for preferences
and technologies have been considered within discrete-time or continuous-
time frameworks, and produce quite different and sometimes contradictory
conclusions.
The objective of this paper is to provide a unified analysis of local inde-
terminacy within an aggregate model with small externalities and to produce
a clear picture of the main sufficient conditions. We consider a continuous-
time formulation which is simpler to deal with. The production side is de-
fined on the basis of a general technology which admits as a particular case
only the Cobb-Douglas formulation with a unitary elasticity of capital-labor
substitution. The preferences side is defined on the basis of four standard
specifications for the utility function which are widely used in the growth
literature: i) an additively separable formulation which has been initially
used by Benhabib and Farmer [2], ii) a linearly homogeneous formulation
for which the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure
depends on their ratio, iii) a King, Plosser and Rebello [13] (KPR) formula-
tion which is compatible with both balanced growth and stationary worked
hours, and finally iv) a Greenwood, Hercovitz and Huffman [9] (GHH) for-
mulation for which the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and leisure depends on the latter only. We assume that the factor-specific
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externalities are small enough to be compatible with aggregate demand func-
tions for capital and labor which are decreasing respectively with respect to
the rental rate and the wage rate.
We show that the existence of multiple equilibrium paths results from a
complex interplay between preferences and technology. First we prove that
even with minimal assumptions on the fundamentals, local indeterminacy
cannot arise when there are only capital externalities but fundamentally
requires labor external effects. Second we show that among the four speci-
fications for preferences, only two are compatible with sunspot fluctuations
under plausible restrictions on the main parameters: i) The additively sep-
arable formulation provided the elasticity of capital-labor substitution is
larger than one. ii) The linear homogeneous formulation provided the elas-
ticity of capital labor substitution is larger than a critical bound which is
smaller than one. In this case, and contrary to the first one, local indeter-
minacy becomes compatible with a Cobb-Douglas technology. The common
conditions for these two configurations require a large enough elasticity of
intertemporal substitution in consumption and a large enough elasticity of
the labor supply. We also show that in both cases the occurrence of local
indeterminacy is intimately linked with the existence of a Hopf bifurcation
and periodic cycles.
Third we prove that uniqueness of the equilibrium is a robust result for
the two other preferences’ specifications, namely the KPR and GHH utility
functions. In the KPR case, the necessary conditions for the existence of lo-
cal indeterminacy are highly umplausible with respect to standard empirical
evidences, while in the GHH case, local indeterminacy is completely ruled
out with small externalities.
This paper is organized as follows: The next section sets up the basic
model, defines the intertemporal equilibrium and proves the existence of
a normalized steady state. In Section 3 we provide our main results: we
start by the benchmark formulation with a Cobb-Douglas technology and
then we study the general case with a non-unitary elasticity of capital-labor
substitution. Section 4 contains concluding comments and all the proofs are
gathered into a final Appendix.
2
2 The model
2.1 The production structure
Consider a perfectly competitive economy in which the final output is pro-
duced using capital K and labor L. Although production takes place under
constant returns to scale, we assume that each of the many firms benefits
from positive externalities due to the contributions of the average levels of
capital and labor, respectively K¯ and L¯. Capital external effects are usually
interpreted as coming from learning by doing while labor externalities are
associated with thick market effects. The production function of a represen-
tative firm is thus AF (K,L)e(K¯, L¯), with F (K,L) homogeneous of degree
one, e(K¯, L¯) increasing in each argument and A > 0 a scaling parameter.
Denoting, for any L 6= 0, x = K/L the capital stock per labor unit, we may
define the production function in intensive form as Af(x)e(K¯, L¯).
Assumption 1. f(x) is Cr over R+ for r large enough, increasing (f ′(x) >
0) and concave (f ′′(x) < 0) over R++.
The rental rate of capital r(t) and the wage rate w(t) then satisfy:
r(t) = Af ′(x(t))e(K¯(t), L¯(t)) (1)
w(t) = A[f(x(t))− x(t)f ′(x(t))]e(K¯(t), L¯(t)) (2)
We may also compute the share of capital in total income:
s(x) = xf
′(x)
f(x) ∈ (0, 1) (3)
the elasticity of capital-labor substitution:
σ(x) = − (1−s(x))f ′(x)xf ′′(x) > 0 (4)
and the elasticities of e(K¯t, L¯t) with respect to capital and labor:
εeK(K¯, L¯) =
e1(K¯,L¯)K¯
e(K¯,L¯)
, εeL(K¯, L¯) =
e2(K¯,L¯)L¯
e(K¯,L¯)
(5)
We consider positive externalities:
Assumption 2. For any given K¯, L¯ > 0, εeK(K¯, L¯) ≥ 0 and εeL(K¯, L¯) ≥
0.
Considering the aggregate consumption C(t), the capital accumulation
equation is then
K˙(t) = L(t)Af(x(t))e(K¯(t), L¯(t))− δK(t)− C(t) (6)
with δ ≥ 0 the depreciation rate of capital and K(0) given.
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2.2 Preferences and intertemporal equilibrium
We consider an economy populated by a large number of identical infinitely-
lived agents. We assume without loss of generality that the total population
is constant and normalized to one, i.e. N = 1. At each period a represen-
tative agent supplies elastically an amount of labor l ∈ [0, `], with ` > 0 his
endowment of labor. He then derives utility from consumption c and leisure
L = `− l according to a non-separable function U(c,L) which satisfies:
Assumption 3. U(c,L) is Cr over R+×[0, `] for r large enough, increasing
with respect to each argument and concave.
We also introduce a standard normality assumption between consumption
and leisure
Assumption 4. Consumption c and leisure L are normal goods.
Actually, within these general properties for the utility function, we will
consider four different particular specifications which are widely used in the
literature.
i) An additively separable utility function U(c,L) = u(c) + v(L/B),
with B > 0 a normalization constant.1 Additive separability implies that
Assumption 4 holds and beside Assumption 3, U(c,L) satisfies the following
properties:
Assumption 5. limx→0 v′(x)x = +∞ and limx→+∞ v′(x)x = 0, or
limx→0 v′(x)x = 0 and limx→+∞ v′(x)x = +∞.2
ii) A linearly homogeneous utility function U(c,L). Assumption 4 then
always holds and beside Assumption 3, we impose the following properties:
Assumption 6. For all c,L > 0, limc/L→0 U2(c,L)/U1(c,L) = 0 and
limc/L→+∞ U2(c,L)/U1(c,L) = +∞.
1The constant B is used to prove the existence of a normalized steady state which
remains invariant with respect to preference parameters such that the elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution in consumption or the elasticity of the labor supply with respect
to wage.
2If v(x) = x1−γ/(1− γ) with γ ≥ 0 the inverse of the elasticity of labor, the first part
of Assumption 5 is satisfied when γ > 1 while the second part holds if γ ∈ [0, 1).
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Building on the linear homogeneity, we may introduce the share of consump-
tion within total utility α(c,L) ∈ (0, 1) defined as follows:
α(c,L) = U1(c,L)cU(c,L) (7)
that will be useful to characterize the steady state.3
iii) A King-Plosser-Rebelo [13] (KPR) formulation such that
U(c,L) = [cv(L)]1−θ1−θ (8)
which is compatible with both balanced growth and stationary worked hours.
Let us define h(L) = v′(L)/v(L) and
ψ(L) = Lh(L), η(L) = Lh′(L)h(L) (9)
Beside Assumption 4, we introduce the following restrictions:
Assumption 7. v(L) is a positive increasing function with θ ≥ 0, η(L) ≤
−ψ(L)(1− θ) and η(L) ≤ ψ(L)(1− 1/θ). Moreover limL→0 h(L) = +∞ and
limL→+∞ h(L) = 0
Assumption 7 implies that Assumption 3 holds.4 Notice that ψ(L) > 0 can
be interpreted as the elasticity of the utility of leisure and η(L) < 0 is linked
to the elasticity of the labor supply with respect to the wage rate lw, namely
η(L) = −L/(llw).5
iv) A Greenwood-Hercovitz-Huffman [9] (GHH) formulation such that
U(c,L) = u(c+G(L/B)) (10)
with u(.) and G(.) some increasing and concave functions, and B > 0 a
normalization constant. Such a specification then satisfies Assumption 3
and implies that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and leisure depends on the latter only as
U2(c,L)
U1(c,L) = G
′(L/B)/B
Beside Assumption 4, we also impose the following properties:
Assumption 8. limx→0G′(x)x = +∞ and limx→+∞G′(x)x = 0, or
limx→0G′(x)x = 0 and limx→+∞G′(x)x = +∞.6
3The share of leisure within total utility is similarly defined as 1− α(c,L) ∈ (0, 1).
4See Hintermaier [10, 11] and Pintus [19].
5This expression is obtained from the total differenciation of equation (19) given below.
6If G(x) = x1−γ/(1 − γ) with γ ≥ 0 the inverse of the elasticity of the function, the
first part of Assumption 8 is satisfied when γ > 1 while the second part holds if γ ∈ [0, 1).
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Since N(t) = 1 for all t ≥ 0, we get L(t) = l(t) and C(t) = c(t).
The intertemporal maximization program of the representative agent is thus
given as follows:
max
c(t),l(t),K(t)
∫ +∞
t=0
e−ρtU(c(t), `− l(t))
s.t. K˙(t) = L(t)Af(x(t))e(K¯(t), L¯(t))− δK(t)− C(t)
K(0) = k0, {K¯(t), l¯(t)}t≥0 given
(11)
where ρ > 0 denotes the discount factor. We introduce the Hamiltonian in
current value:
H = U(c(t), `− l(t)) + λ(t)
[
L(t)Af(x(t))e(K¯(t), L¯(t))− δK(t)− C(t)
]
with λ(t) the shadow price of capital K(t). Considering the prices (1)-(2),
we derive the following first order conditions
U1(c(t), `− l(t)) = λ(t) (12)
U2(c(t), `− l(t)) = λ(t)w(t) (13)
λ˙(t) = −λ(t) [r(t)− ρ− δ] (14)
Any solution needs also to satisfy the transversality condition
lim
t→+∞ e
−ρtU1(c(t), `− l(t))K(t) = 0 (15)
All firms being identical, the competitive equilibrium conditions imply
that K¯(t) = K(t) and l¯(t) = l(t). Under Assumptions 3 and 4, solving
equations (12)-(13) with respect to c(t) and l(t) gives consumption demand
and labor supply functions c(K(t), λ(t)) and l(K(t), λ(t)). Using (1)-(2), we
get equilibrium values for the rental rate of capital r(t) and the wage rate
w(t):
r(t) = Af ′(x(t))e(K(t), l(K(t), λ(t)) ≡ r(K(t), λ(t))
w(t) = A[f(x(t))− x(t)f ′(x(t))]e(K(t), l(K(t), λ(t)) ≡ w(K(t), λ(t)) (16)
with x(t) = K(t)/l(K(t), λ(t)). From the capital accumulation equation (6)
and (14), we finally derive the following system of differential equations in
K and λ:
K˙(t) = l(K(t), λ(t))Af(x(t))e(K(t), l(K(t), λ(t)))− δK(t)
− c(K(t), λ(t))
λ˙(t) = −λ(t) [r(K(t), λ(t))− ρ− δ]
(17)
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An intertemporal equilibrium is then a path {K(t), λ(t)}t≥0, with K(0) =
k0 > 0, that satisfies equations (17) and the transversality condition (15).
2.3 Steady state
A steady state is a 4-uple (K∗, l∗, x∗, c∗) such that x∗ = K∗/l∗ and:
Af ′(x∗)e(x∗l∗, l∗) = δ + ρ, c∗ = l∗Af(x∗)e(x∗l∗, l∗)− δx∗l∗ (18)
U2(c∗, `− l∗) = A[f(x∗)− x∗f ′(x∗)]e(x∗l∗, l∗)U1(c∗, `− l∗) (19)
We use the scaling parameter A in order to give conditions for the exis-
tence of a normalized steady state (NSS in the sequel) such that x∗ = 1 and
l∗ = l¯ with l¯ ∈ (0, `).
Proposition 1. Let Assumptions 1-2 hold and A = A∗ ≡ (δ+ρ)/f ′(1)e(l¯, l¯).
Then a NSS satisfying (K∗, l∗, x∗, c∗) = (l¯, l¯, 1, l¯(δ(1 − s(1)) + ρ)/s(1)) is a
solution of (18)-(19) if one of the following sets of conditions holds:
i) U(c,L) = u(c) + v(L/B), Assumptions 3, 4, 5 hold, v′(L/B) +
(L/B)v′′(L/B) 6= 0 and B = B∗ with B∗ the unique solution of v′((` −
l¯)/B)/B = u′(l¯(δ(1− s(1)) + ρ)/s(1))w(l¯, l¯).
ii) U(c,L) is linearly homogeneous and Assumptions 3, 6 hold.
iii) U(c,L) = [cv(L)]1−θ /(1− θ) and Assumptions 4, 7 hold.
iv) U(c,L) = u(c + G(L/B)), Assumptions 4, 8 hold, G′(L/B) +
(L/B)G′′(L/B) 6= 0 and B = B∗ with B∗ the unique solution of G′((` −
l¯)/B)/B = w(l¯, l¯).
Proof : See Appendix 5.1.
In the rest of the paper, we evaluate all the shares and elasticities previously
defined at the NSS. From (3), (4), (5) and (7), we consider indeed s(1) = s,
σ(1) = σ, εeK(l¯, l¯) = εeK , εeL(l¯, l¯) = εeL, α(c¯, ` − l¯) = α, ψ(` − l¯) = ψ and
η(`− l¯) = η.
Remark 1 : When the utility function is linear homogeneous or assume
the KPR formulation, we do not need to introduce a normalization constant
B. Indeed, considering the prices (16) and the shares and elasticities defined
by (3), (7) and (9), the first order condition (19) can be written as follows
l¯
`−l¯ =
α
1−α
(1−s)(δ+ρ)
δ(1−s)+ρ (20)
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for a linear homogeneous utility function, and
l¯
`−l¯ =
(1−s)(δ+ρ)
ψ[δ(1−s)+ρ] (21)
for a KPR utility function. Hence, choosing a particular value for the sta-
tionary labor supply l¯ ∈ (0, `) implies to consider a particular value for the
share of consumption into total utility α ∈ (0, 1) or for the elasticity of the
utility of leisure ψ > 0. Notice however that ψ has to satisfy Assumption 7.
Remark 2 : Using a continuity argument we derive from Proposition 1
that there exists an intertemporal equilibrium for any initial capital stock
k0 in the neighborhood of K∗. Notice also that Proposition 1 ensures the
existence and uniqueness of the NSS. However, the presence of externalities
implies that one or two other steady states may co-exist.
3 Indeterminacy with small externalities
Let us linearize the dynamical system (17) around the NSS. We introduce
the following elasticities:
cc = − U1(c,L)U11(c,L)c , Lc = −
U2(c,L)
U21(c,L)c , cL = −
U1(c,L)
U12(c,L)L , LL = −
U2(c,L)
U22(c,L)L ,
However, it is more convenient to write the linearized dynamical system
in terms of elasticities with respect to labor. Let U˜(c, l) ≡ U(c, ` − l) a
decreasing and concave function with respect to l. We get U˜1(c, l) = U1(c, `−
l), U˜2(c, l) = −U2(c, `− l), U˜12(c, l) = −U12(c, `− l), U˜22(c, l) = U22(c, `− l)
and thus:
lc = − U˜2U˜21c = Lc, cl = −
U˜1
U˜12l
= −cL `−ll , ll = − U˜2U˜22l = −LL
`−l
l (22)
Since U˜(c, l) is decreasing and concave with respect to l, the elasticity ll is
negative. Notice that an additively separable utility function is characterized
by cl = lc =∞.
We first introduce through the following Lemma a useful relationship
between lc and cl.7
Lemma 1. Let Assumptions 1 and 3 hold. Then at the NSS
cl = − δ(1−s)+ρ(1−s)(δ+ρ)lc (23)
7A similar relationship has been obtained by Hintermaier [10, 11].
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Considering all these elasticities evaluated at the NSS together with Lemma
1, we get the following Proposition:
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1-3, the characteristic polynomial is
P(λ) = λ2 − λT +D
with
D = δ+ρ∆
{
εeL
[
δ(1−s)+ρ
sσ
(
1
cc
− 1lc − 1
)
− ρ(1−σ)σ
(
1
cc
− 1lc
)]
+ εeK
[
(1−s)(δ+ρ)(1−σ)
sσ
(
1
cc
− 1lc
)
+ δ(1−s)+ρs
(
1
ll
− 1cl − 1σ
)]
+ (1−s)[δ(1−s)+ρ]sσ
(
1
cc
− 1lc − 1ll + 1cl
)}
T = ρ+ εeL(δ+ρ)∆
(
σ−1
σcc
− 1lc
)
− εeK(δ+ρ)s∆
[
(1− s)
(
1
cc
− 1lc
)
+ sccσ
−
(
1
ccll
− 1cllc
) ]
and
∆ = 1cc
(
1
ll
+ εeL − sσ
)
− 1cllc
Proof : See Appendix 5.3.
In order to have aggregate demand functions for capital and labor which
are decreasing respectively with respect to the rental rate and the wage rate,
we introduce the following assumption on the size of externalities:
Assumption 9. εeK < (1− s)/σ and εeL < s/σ.
Notice that concavity of the utility function implies
1
ccll
− 1cllc ≤ 0 (24)
and under Assumption 9 we derive ∆ < 0. Moreover, Assumption 4 implies
1
cc
− 1lc ≥ 0 (25)
Our aim is to discuss the local indeterminacy properties of equilibria,
i.e. the existence of a continuum of equilibrium paths starting from the
same initial capital stock and converging to the NSS. Our model consists in
one predetermined variable, the capital stock, and one forward variable, the
shadow price of capital. Therefore, the NSS is locally indeterminate if and
only if the local stable manifold is two-dimensional, i.e. if and only if D > 0
and T < 0.
9
We may provide a first general result from (24), (25) and a direct inspec-
tion of T . Indeed, on the one hand, if there is no externality coming from
labor, i.e. εeL = 0, then T > 0. On the other hand, even with externalities
from capital and labor, T > 0 if 1−1/σ ≤ cc/lc. We then get the following
result:
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 9, the NSS is locally
determinate in the following cases:
i) When εeL = 0.8
ii) When 1/σ ≥ 1− cc/lc.
In case i), we show that for any utility function satisfying standard assump-
tions, local indeterminacy is ruled out if there is no externality coming from
labor. We generalize a conclusion already shown in discrete-time models
with linear homogeneous preferences.9 We also prove that Theorem 4 of
Hintermaier [10] (p.14), which claims that in a one-sector model with Cobb-
Douglas technology and no externalities in labor, there are non-separable
preferences consistent with indeterminacy if capital externalities are high
enough, is not compatible with the concavity and normality assumptions.
Notice though that his existence result is obtained through numerical simu-
lations which do not allow to determine the precise formulation of the utility
function.
In case ii), we show that local indeterminacy requires a large enough
elasticity of capital-labor substitution. Notice that this bound may be lower
or larger than 1 depending on whether lc is negative or positive. In any
case, we conclude that local indeterminacy is ruled out if the production
function is close enough to a Leontief technology.
In the following, we will first concentrate on the consideration of a Cobb-
Douglas technology, i.e. σ = 1, as this case has been widely studied in the
literature.10 This will represent a benchmark formulation from which we
will derive more general results with σ > 0.
8In an OLG model, we also show in Lloyd-Braga, Nourry and Venditti [16] that when
only capital externalities enter the technology and the homogeneous utility function is
characterized by a large share of young agents’ consumption over the wage income, the
steady state is locally determinate.
9See Lloyd-Braga, Nourry and Venditti [15].
10See Benhabib and Farmer [2], Bennett and Farmer [4], Hintermaier [10, 11].
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3.1 Cobb-Douglas technology
When σ = 1 we derive from Proposition 2 simplified expressions for D and
T :
D = δ+ρ∆
{
εeL
δ(1−s)+ρ
s
(
1
cc
− 1lc − 1
)
+ εeK
δ(1−s)+ρ
s
(
1
ll
− 1cl − 1
)
+ (1−s)[δ(1−s)+ρ]s
(
1
cc
− 1lc − 1ll + 1cl
)}
T = ρ− εeL(δ+ρ)∆lc −
εeK(δ+ρ)
s∆
[
(1− s)
(
1
cc
− 1lc
)
+ scc −
(
1
ccll
− 1cllc
) ] (26)
We first show as in Hintermaier [10, 11] that when the utility function is
either additively separable, or satisfies the KPR or GHH formulation, then
local indeterminacy is ruled out. Indeed if U(c,L) = u(c)+ v(L/B), we get
T = ρ− εeK(δ+ρ)∆scc
(
1− 1ll
)
> 0
Moreover if U(c,L) = [cv(L)]1−θ /(1− θ), we easily derive that
1
cc
= 1lc + 1 (27)
and thus
D = δ+ρ∆ δ(1−s)+ρs
(
1
ll
− 1cl − 1
)
(εeK − (1− s))
Mixing (24) and (27) we get
1
ll
− 1cl < −
cc
cl
< 1 (28)
so thatD < 0. We also conclude from (26) that T > 0 for any utility function
satisfying Assumption 4 and lc ≥ 0. But such a property is satisfied when
U(c,L) = u(c+G(L/B)) as we easily get in this case that cc = lc > 0. We
have then proved:
Proposition 4. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 9, let σ = 1. Then the
NSS is locally determinate in the following cases:
i) When U(c,L) = u(c) + v(L/B).
ii) When U(c,L) = [cv(L)]1−θ /(1− θ) and Assumptions 4 and 7 holds.
iii) When U(c,L) satisfies Assumption 4 and lc ≥ 0.
The consideration of weak externalities through Assumption 9 has strong
consequences on the local stability properties of the NSS. Notice indeed
that in the particular case of additively separable preferences, a necessary
condition for T < 0 is ∆ > 0, but this property requires an increasing labor
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demand function, i.e. εeL > s, as shown in Benhabib and Farmer [4]. In the
case of a KPR utility function initially considered by Bennett and Farmer
[4], we easily show as in Hintermaier [10, 11] that local indeterminacy with
a negatively sloped labor demand function is ruled out as soon as we impose
concavity of preferences. We also provide a new conclusion showing that
local indeterminacy cannot occur for any type of utility function with a
negative cross derivative U12.
Proposition 4 gives conditions to rule out local indeterminacy. We may
now focus on conditions ensuring the existence of multiple equilibrium paths.
We consider a linear homogeneous utility function. Using the Euler Theo-
rem, we know that U12 = −(c/L)U11 and U22 = (c/L)2U11. We then derive
from (7), (20) and (22):
lc = −cc 1−αα , cl = cc 1−αα δ(1−s)+ρ(1−s)(δ+ρ) , ll = −cc
(
1−α
α
)2 δ(1−s)+ρ
(1−s)(δ+ρ) (29)
so that 1/ccll−1/cllc = 0 and ∆ = (εeL−s)/cc. Notice also that lc < 0,
cl > 0 and ll < 0.
Remark 3 : From a total differenciation of equation (19), we can define
the elasticity of the labor supply with respect to the real wage as follows:
dl
dw
w
l ≡ lw = −αll > 0 (30)
Thus, for any α ∈ (0, 1), lw may be equivalently appraised through ll.
As Proposition 3 shows that capital externalities do not play a positive
role for the existence of local indeterminacy, we also assume that εeK = 0.
This allows to consider a mild amount of increasing returns. We then get:
D = δ+ρεeL−s
δ(1−s)+ρ
s(1−α)
{
εeL [1− cc(1− α)] + 1−s1−α δ(1−s)+ρ(1−αs)δ(1−s)+ρ
}
T = ρ+ εeL(δ+ρ)α(εeL−s)(1−α)
(31)
It follows that D > 0 if and only if
cc >
εeL+
1−s
1−α
δ(1−s)+ρ(1−αs)
δ(1−s)+ρ
εeL(1−α) ≡ cc (32)
and T < 0 if and only if
α > ρ(s−εeL)δεeL+ρs ≡ α (33)
Recall now from Remark 1 and equation (20) that the normalized stationary
value for labor l¯ is obtained for a given value of α. Such value needs therefore
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to be chosen so as to satisfy condition (33). However, for such a given value
of α, we need to be able to choose a value of cc that satisfies condition
(38). But cc and α are linked through the elasticity of substitution between
consumption and leisure. Indeed, denoting this elasticity as
φ(c,L) =
U2(c/L,1)/U1(c/L,1)
c/L
∂U2(c/L,1)/U1(c/L,1)
∂c/L
and using (7) and (20), we derive at the NSS
φ = cc(1− α)
Therefore, condition (38) maybe satisfied if and only if
φ > 1 + (1−s)[δ(1−s)+ρ(1−αs)]εeL(1−α)[δ(1−s)+ρ] ≡ φ (34)
As a result, with Cobb-Douglas preferences, where φ = 1, local indetermi-
nacy is ruled out. We have then proved:11
Proposition 5. Let U(c,L) be linear homogeneous, Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 6
and 9 hold, σ = 1 and εeK = 0. Then the NSS is locally indeterminate if
and only if α > α and cc > cc (or equivalently φ > φ).
Local indeterminacy requires a large enough share of consumption within
total utility and a large enough elasticity of intertemporal substitution in
consumption. It is worth noticing that cc > 1. Using (29) and (30), this last
restriction implies that the elasticity of labor supply is also large enough.
Notice that as usual, if the amount of labor externalities goes toward zero,
the lower bound on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consump-
tion goes toward +∞.
A puzzeling question remains however: Why is it possible to easily get
local indeterminacy with linear homogeneous preferences while local deter-
minacy always occurs with KPR preferences ? One basic reason explains this
fact: Consider ψ > 0 and η < 0 as defined in Assumption 7 and evaluated
at the NSS. Total differenciation of equation (19) gives
lw = − `−l¯ηl¯
and using (21) we obtain
lw = −ψη δ(1−s)+ρ(1−s)(δ+ρ)
11A similar conclusion has been reached in a discrete-time setting by Lloyd-Braga,
Nourry and Venditti [15].
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Recall now that Assumption 7 requires η ≤ ψ(1− 1/θ), with 1/θ = cc. We
derive therefore from the previous equality that
δ(1−s)+ρ
lw(1−s)(δ+ρ) ≥ cc − 1
But as shown in Proposition 5 and using (29), local indeterminacy requires
large enough values for both cc and lw.
We may finally discuss the existence of a Hopf bifurcation which is as-
sociated with the existence of two complex roots on the imaginary axis, i.e.
with parameters’ values for which T = 0 and D > 0. Notice indeed that
when α = α as defined by (33), then T = 0. Let us then denote

α
cc ≡ εeL+
1−s
1−α
δ(1−s)+ρ(1−αs)
δ(1−s)+ρ
εeL(1−α)
(35)
If cc > 
α
cc, we get D > 0 when α = α and the following result is derived:
Proposition 6. Let U(c,L) be linear homogeneous, Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 6
and 9 hold, σ = 1 and εeK = 0. Consider the bound α as defined by (33) and
assume that cc > 
α
cc. Then when α crosses α from above, there generically
exists a Hopf bifurcation giving rise to locally indeterminate (resp. locally
unstable) periodic orbits for any α in a left (resp. right) neighborhood of α.
The existence of local indeterminacy appears then to be intimately associ-
ated with periodic cycles.
3.2 General technology
We may now consider the general model with σ 6= 1.
3.2.1 Additively separable preferences
Consider first the case of additively separable preferences. We derive from
Proposition 2:
D = δ+ρ∆
{
εeL
[
δ(1−s)+ρ
sσ
(
1
cc
− 1
)
− ρ(1−σ)σcc
]
+ εeK
[
(1−s)(δ+ρ)(1−σ)
sσcc
+ δ(1−s)+ρs
(
1
ll
− 1σ
) ]
+ (1−s)[δ(1−s)+ρ]sσ
(
1
cc
− 1ll
)}
T = ρ+ εeL(δ+ρ)(σ−1)σ∆cc −
εeK(δ+ρ)
s∆cc
(
1− s+ sσ − 1ll
)
Notice that as suggested by Propositions 3 and 4, T > 0 when σ ≤ 1.
Moreover, under Assumption 9, we easily get when labor is inelastic
14
lim
ll→0−
D < 0
Finally, based again on Proposition 3, if we assume that there are no capital
externalities, i.e. εeK = 0, we get D < 0 when σ > 1 and cc ≤ 1.12 We have
then proved:
Proposition 7. Let U(c,L) = u(c) + v(L/B) and Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and
9 hold. Then the NSS is locally determinate in the following cases:
i) When σ ≤ 1.
ii) When ll = 0.13
iii) When εeK = 0, σ > 1 and cc ≤ 1.
We show that with additively separable preferences, local indeterminacy re-
quires a large enough (larger than 1) elasticity of capital-labor substitution,
endogenous labor and a large enough elasticity of intertemporal substitution
in consumption. Let us now focus on clear-cut conditions for the existence
of local indeterminacy. When εeK = 0, we may again simplify D and T as
follows
D = δ+ρ∆sσ
{
1
cc
[
εeL [δ(1− s) + ρ[1− s(1− σ)]] + (1− s)[δ(1− s) + ρ]
]
− εeL[δ(1− s) + ρ]− (1−s)[δ(1−s)+ρ]ll
}
T = 1σ∆cc
{
εeL [(δ + ρ)(σ − 1) + ρσ] + ρσ
(
1
ll
− sσ
)}
As ll > 0, assuming σ > 1 implies D > 0 if and only if
ll < −1−sεeL ≡ 1ll and cc >
εeL
“
δ(1−s)+ρ
sσ
+
ρ(σ−1)
σ
”
+
(1−s)[δ(1−s)+ρ]
sσ
δ(1−s)+ρ
sσ
“
εeL+
1−s
ll
” ≡ cc > 1 (36)
and T < 0 if and only if
ll < − ρεeL(δ+2ρ) ≡ 2ll and σ >
εeL(δ+ρ)+sρ
ρ
ll
+εeL(δ+2ρ)
≡ σ > 1 (37)
Let us denote ¯ll = min{1ll, 2ll}.14 Proceeding as in Remark 3, when the
utility function is additively separable, the elasticity of the labor supply
12It is worth noticing however that when εeK > 0, D may be positive with σ > 1 and
cc ≤ 1 provided εeK is large enough. We do not explore this case as we want to consider
extremely small externalities.
13Boldrin and Rustichini [5] and Kehoe [12] provide a similar conclusion in a discrete-
time model.
14Notice that 1ll < 
2
ll if s < 1/2.
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with respect to the wage rate is given by lw = −ll. We may then define
lw ≡ −¯ll, and we get:15
Proposition 8. Let U(c,L) = u(c) + v(L/B), Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and
9 hold, and εeK = 0. Then, for any given lw > lw, the NSS is locally
indeterminate if and only if σ > σ > 1 and cc > cc > 1.
Notice that the bounds lw and σ converge to +∞ when the amount of labor
externalities εeL approaches zero. Moreover, as usual in one-sector models,
local indeterminacy is based on a large enough elasticity of the labor supply.
We may again focus on the existence of a Hopf bifurcation. Notice indeed
that when lw > lw and σ = σ as defined by (37), then T = 0. Let us then
denote

σ
cc ≡
εeL
“
δ(1−s)+ρ
sσ
+
ρ(σ−1)
σ
”
+
(1−s)[δ(1−s)+ρ]
sσ
δ(1−s)+ρ
sσ
“
εeL+
1−s
ll
” (38)
If cc > 
σ
cc, we get D > 0 when σ = σ and the following result is derived:
Proposition 9. Let U(c,L) = u(c) + v(L/B), Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 9
hold, and εeK = 0. Consider the bound σ as defined by (37) and assume that
lw > lw and cc > 
σ
cc. Then when σ crosses σ from above, there generically
exists a Hopf bifurcation giving rise to locally indeterminate (resp. locally
unstable) periodic orbits for any σ in a left (resp. right) neighborhood of σ.9
Again the existence of local indeterminacy appears to be intimately associ-
ated with periodic cycles. Notice however that such a conclusion is closely
related to Assumption 9 restricting the size of externalities. Indeed, if As-
sumption 9 does not hold, as shown in Benhabib and Farmer [2] under a
Cobb-Douglas, local indeterminacy may arise provided the externalities are
large enough to generate a positively sloped labour demand function, but a
Hopf bifurcation cannot occur since the characteristic roots are bifurcating
through an infinite real part.
3.2.2 Linear homogeneous preferences
Consider now the case of linear homogeneous preferences. Using (29), we
derive from Proposition 2:
15The same kind of conclusions has been obtained by Pintus [18] in a discrete-time
setting.
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D = δ+ρ(εeL− sσ )sσ(1−α)
{
εeL
[
[δ(1− s) + ρ] [1− cc(1− α)]− sρ(1− σ)
]
+ εeK
[
(1−s)(δ+ρ)(1−α−σ)
1−α − [δ(1− s) + ρ]cc(1− α)
]
+ 1−s1−α [δ(1− s) + ρ(1− αs)]
}
T = ρ+ (δ+ρ)εeL− sσ
{
εeL
(
σ−(1−α)
σ(1−α)
)
− εeKs
[
1−s
1−α +
s
σ
]}
Notice that under Assumption 9, if σ < 1− α, then T > 0.
Proposition 10. Let U(c,L) be linear homogeneous and Assumptions 1, 2,
3 and 9 hold. Then the NSS is locally determinate if σ < 1− α.
Let us now focus on the existence of local indeterminacy. When εeK = 0,
we have D > 0 if and only if
cc >
εeL[δ(1−s)+ρ[1−s(1−σ)]]+ 1−s1−α [δ(1−s)+ρ(1−αs)]
εeL(1−α)[δ(1−s)+ρ] ≡ cc (39)
and T < 0 if and only if
σ > (1− α) sρ+εeL(δ+ρ)εeL[ρ(1−α)+δ+ρ] ≡ σ (40)
Notice that as a non-unitary elasticity of capital-labor substitution σ is
considered, the sign of T is more conveniently discussed with respect to
σ than with respect to α. Recall now that cc and α are linked through
the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure φ, namely
φ = cc(1−α). It follows that condition (39) may be satisfied if and only if
φ >
εeL[δ(1−s)+ρ[1−s(1−σ)]]+ 1−s1−α [δ(1−s)+ρ(1−αs)]
εeL[δ(1−s)+ρ] ≡ φ (41)
We have then proved:16
Proposition 11. Let U(c,L) be linear homogeneous, Assumptions 1, 2, 3,
6 and 9 hold, and εeK = 0. Then the NSS is locally indeterminate if and
only if σ > σ and cc > cc (or equivalently φ > φ).
We prove that with linear homogeneous preferences, local indeterminacy
requires a large enough elasticity of capital-labor substitution and a large
enough elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption (or equiv-
alently a large enough elasticity of substitution between consumption and
16A similar conclusion has been reached in a discrete-time setting by Lloyd-Braga,
Nourry and Venditti [15].
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leisure). As suggested by (29), this last condition implies also a large enough
elasticity of the labor supply. As shown by Proposition 5, the lower bound
σ may be less than one and thus the critical bound φ on the elasticity of
substitution between consumption and leisure may be also less than one. It
follows that if the elasticity of capital-labor substitution is less than unity,
local indeterminacy becomes compatible with a linearly homogeneous Cobb-
Douglas utility function. Notice however that if we assume s ≤ 1/2, this is
no longer true as φ becomes larger than one.17
As in Section 3.1, the Hopf bifurcation is closely related to the existence
of local indeterminacy. Notice that when σ = σ as defined by (40), then
T = 0. Let us then denote

σ
cc ≡ εeL[δ(1−s)+ρ[1−s(1−σ)]]+
1−s
1−α [δ(1−s)+ρ(1−αs)]
εeL(1−α)[δ(1−s)+ρ] (42)
If cc > 
σ
cc, we still get D > 0 when σ = σ and the following result is derived:
Proposition 12. Let U(c,L) be linear homogeneous, Assumptions 1, 2, 3,
6 and 9 hold, and εeK = 0. Consider the bound σ as defined by (40) and
assume that cc > 
σ
cc. Then when σ crosses σ from above, there generically
exists a Hopf bifurcation giving rise to locally indeterminate (resp. locally
unstable) periodic orbits for any α in a left (resp. right) neighborhood of α.
This Proposition therefore extends Proposition 6 to the case of a general
production function.
3.2.3 KPR preferences
Consider now a KPR utility function. Using (27), we derive from Proposition
2:
D = δ+ρ∆
{
− εeL ρ(1−σ)σ + δ(1−s)+ρs
(
1
ll
− 1cl − 1
) (
εeK − 1−sσ
)− εeK (1−σ)ρσ }
T = ρ+ εeL(δ+ρ)∆
(
σcc−1
σcc
)
− εeK(δ+ρ)s∆
[
1− s+ sccσ −
(
1
ccll
− 1cllc
) ]
Assumption 9 and (28) imply that D < 0 when σ ≥ 1. Moreover, when
σ < 1, we get T > 0 as soon as cc ≤ 1 or σ ≤ 1/cc. Consider then
cc > 1 and σ ∈ (1/cc, 1). Building again on Proposition 3, assume that
17Indeed, when s < 1/2, conditions (40) and (41) cannot hold simultaneously with
Assumption 9.
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εeK = 0 in order to keep externalities as small as possible.18 As shown by
(21), normalyzing the steady state with (`− l¯)/l¯ = a > 0 gives
ψ = a(1−s)(δ+ρ)[δ(1−s)+ρ] (43)
We also derive
cc = 1θ , lc = − 11−θ , cl = δ(1−s)+ρ(1−θ)(1−s)(δ+ρ) , ll = a[δ(1−s)+ρ]η[δ(1−s)+ρ]+(1−θ)a(1−s)(δ+ρ)
Notice that cc > 1 is equivalent to θ < 1 and implies lc < 0 and cl > 0.
Moreover, Assumption 7 implies
θ > θ ≡ a(1−s)(δ+ρ)a(1−s)(δ+ρ)−η[δ(1−s)+ρ] ∈ (0, 1) (44)
and we derive under this restriction that ll < 0. It follows also that σ >
θ > θ is a necessary condition for local indeterminacy.
We get after simplifications
D = δ+ρ∆σ
{
−εeLρ(1− σ) + (a−η)(1−s)[δ(1−s)+ρ]sa
}
T = 1σ∆
{
εeL [(δ + ρ)(σ − θ) + ρσθ]
− ρσ
[
θs
σ +
θ[a(1−s)(δ+ρ)−η[δ(1−s)+ρ]]−a(1−s)(δ+ρ)
a[δ(1−s)+ρ]
]} (45)
We easily derive that D > 0 if and only if
εeL >
(a−η)(1−s)[δ(1−s)+ρ]
asρ(1−σ) ≡ ε1eL (46)
But Assumption 9 requires that ε1eL < s/σ and this inequality is satisfied if
and only if
σ < s
2aρ
(a−η)(1−s)[δ(1−s)+ρ]+s2aρ ≡ σ¯ (47)
It is easy to notice that σ¯ < s. Recall now that as we have assumed σ > θ,
we need θ < σ¯. Straightforward computations show that this last inequality
finally requires s > s > 1/2.
The following Proposition summarizes all the above results:
Proposition 13. Let U(c,L) = [cv(L)]1−θ /(1−θ) and Assumptions 1, 2, 4,
7 and 9 hold. Then the NSS is locally determinate in the following cases:19
i) When σ ≥ 1.
18It is also clear that as T is an increasing function of εeK , externalities from capital
favor the occurrence of local determinacy.
19Similar results as in cases i), iii) and v) have been reached in a discrete-time setting
by Pintus [19].
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ii) When σ < 1 and θ ≥ 1.
iii) When θ < 1 and σ ∈ (0, θ].
iv) When εeK = 0, θ < 1 and σ ∈ [s, 1).
v) When εeK = 0, θ < 1 σ ∈ (0, s) and s < s with s > 1/2.
When KPR preferences are considered local indeterminacy requires dras-
tically different conditions on the elasticity of capital-labor substitution than
with additively separable or linear homogeneous preferences. Indeed, in case
i) we show that the elasticity of capital-labor substitution needs to be lower
than unity here while it has to be larger than unity under the specifications
of Propositions 8 and 11. In cases ii) and iii), we prove at the same time
that the elasticity of capital-labor substitution needs to be larger than the
inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption which
is restricted to be larger than 1. In case iv), we also show that although
labor externalities are considered, local indeterminacy necessarily requires
an elasticity of capital-labor substitution lower than the share of capital in
total income. Notice at this point this conclusion appears to be very similar
to those obtained within standard models which are free of externalities, i.e.
overlapping generations models with endogenous labor,20 and infinite hori-
zon models with heterogeneous agents and financial constraint.21 Finally, in
case v), we show that all these restrictions on σ are compatible only if the
share of capital s is strictly larger than 1/2.
To summarize, local indeterminacy requires the following conditions:
θ < s, σ ∈ (θ, s) ⊂ (0, 1) and s > 1/2. Duffy and Papageorgiou [7] have
recently proved that the elasticity of capital-labor substitution within de-
veloped countries is significantly larger than unity. Moreover, it is a well-
established fact that the share of capital in OECD coutries is generically
lower than 1/2. Proposition 14 then implies that local indeterminacy is
extremely unlikely when a KPR utility function is considered.
3.2.4 GHH preferences
Consider finally a GHH utility function. Let us denote
GLL = − G
′(L/B)
G′′(L/B)(L/B) > 0
20See Cazzavillan and Pintus [6], Lloyd-Braga [14], Nourry and Venditti [17] and Re-
ichlin [21].
21See Grandmont, Pintus and de Vilder [8] and Woodford [22].
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the elasticity of the function G(L/B). We easily get from (22) that
cc = lc and 1ll =
1
cl
+ 1
Gll
with Gll = −GLL `−l¯l¯ < 0
We then derive from Proposition 2
T = ρ− εeL(δ+ρ)cc∆ −
εeK(δ+ρ)
ccs∆
(
s
σ − 1Gll
)
> 0 (48)
We have thus proved:
Proposition 14. Let U(c,L) = u(c+G(L/B) and Assumptions 1, 2, 4, 8
and 9 hold. Then the NSS is always locally determinate.
This Proposition shows that the GHH specification is even worse than the
KPR specification as local indeterminacy is completely ruled out as soon as
we restrict the externalities to satisfy Assumption 9. Notice indeed that if
on the contrary we allow for large external effects leading to an increasing
labor demand function, then we derive from (48) that local indeterminacy
might be obtained as T might be negative.
4 Concluding comments
In this paper we have studied a Ramsey-type aggregate model with four
different formulations for preferences which are widely used in the litera-
ture, a general technology, endogenous labor and factor-specific productive
external effects arising from average capital and labor. First, we have shown
under minimal retrictions on the fundamentals that indeterminacy cannot
arise when there are only capital externalities but that it does when there are
only labor external effects. Second, we have proved that only the additively-
separable and linear homogeneous specifications for the utility function allow
to get local indeterminacy under small externalities and plausible restrictions
on the main parameters, namely, the elasticity of capital-labor substitution,
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption and the elastic-
ity of the labor supply needs to be large enough. However, a Cobb-Douglas
technology appears to be compatible with local indeterminacy with a linear
homogeneous utility function while this cannot be the case with an addi-
tively separable one. Third, we have shown that the existence of sunspot
fluctuations is intimately related to the occurrence of periodic cycles through
a Hopf bifurcation. Fourth, we have proved that the existence of multiple
equilibria is ruled out when KPR or GHH preferences are considered as soon
21
as plausible restrictions on the main parameters are imposed. These results
then show that the existence of local indeterminacy is the outcome of a
complex interplay between preferences and technology.
5 Appendix
5.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Consider equations (18) and (19): (x∗, l∗, c∗) = (1, l¯, c¯) is a steady state if
there exists a value for A such that:
c¯ = l¯Af(1)e(l¯, l¯)− δl¯, U2(c¯,`−l¯)
U1(c¯,`−l¯) = A[f(1)− f
′(1)]e(l¯, l¯), Af ′(1)e(l¯, l¯) = δ + ρ
Solving the third equation gives
A = δ+ρ
f ′(1)e(l¯,l¯) ≡ A∗
and considering A = A∗ into the first and second equations implies
c¯ = l¯ δ(1−s)+ρs ≡ l¯C, U2(l¯C,`−l¯)U1(l¯C,`−l¯) ≡ g(l¯) =
(1−s)(δ+ρ)
s (49)
with s = s(1).
i) Consider the case of an additively separable utility function such that
U(c,L) = u(c) + v(L/B), with B > 0 a normalization constant. We get
g(l¯) = v
′((`−l¯)/B)
Bu′(l¯C) ≡ g˜(B)
If v′(L/B) + (L/B)v′′(L/B) 6= 0 then g˜′(B) 6= 0 and Assumption 5 implies
that there exists a unique value B∗ of B such that when B = B∗, l¯ satisfies
equation (49).
ii) Consider the case of a linear homogeneous utility function. Under
Assumptions 3 and 4 we get liml¯→0 g(l¯) = 0 and liml¯→` g(l¯) = +∞ with
g′(l¯) > 0. It follows that there exists a unique NSS with x∗ = 1 and
l∗ = l¯ ∈ (0, `).
iii) Consider a KPR utility function such that U(c,L) = [cv(L)]1−θ /(1−
θ). We then get
g(l¯) = cv
′(`−l¯)
v(`−l¯) = ch(`− l¯)
Equation (49) can thus be written as
l¯h(`− l¯) ≡ g˜(l¯) = (1−s)(δ+ρ)δ(1−s)+ρ
and Assumption 7 implies liml¯→0 g˜(l¯) = 0, liml¯→` g˜(l¯) = +∞ and g˜′(l¯) > 0.
Therefore there exists a unique NSS with x∗ = 1 and l∗ = l¯ ∈ (0, `).
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iv) Consider finally a GHH utility function such that U(c,L) = u(c +
G(L/B)), with B > 0 a normalization constant. We get
g(l¯) = G′((`− l¯)/B)/B ≡ g˜(B)
If G′(L/B)+ (L/B)G′′(L/B) 6= 0 then g˜′(B) 6= 0 and Assumption 8 implies
that there exists a unique value B∗ of B such that when B = B∗, l¯ satisfies
equation (49).
5.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Using (22) and the first order conditions (12) and (13), we get cl =
−lc(c/wl). But using the expression of w at the NSS given in (16) to-
gether with (3) we find wl = (1− s)(c+ δK). Recall then that at the NSS,
c = l¯Af(1)e(l¯, l¯)− δl¯. We then derive using again (3)
c+δK
K =
δ+ρ
s ,
c
K =
δ(1−s)+ρ
s
(50)
The result follows.
5.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Consider the first order conditions (12) and (13). Under Assumptions 3 and
4, solving with respect to c(t) and l(t) gives consumption demand and labor
supply functions c(K(t), λ(t)) and l(K(t), λ(t)). Using (22), the implicit
function Theorem allows to get the partial derivatives of these functions
evaluated at the NSS
dc
dK =
c
K∆
εeK+
s
σ
cl
, dcdλ = − cλ∆
(
1
ll
+ εeL − sσ − 1cl
)
dl
dK = − lK∆
εeK+
s
σ
cc
, dldλ = − lλ∆
(
1
cc
− 1lc
)
with
∆ = 1cc
(
1
ll
+ εeL − sσ
)
− 1cllc
From these results and (16) we also derive at the NSS
dr
dK =
r
K
[
εeK − 1−sσ −
(
εeL + 1−sσ
) εeK sσ
cc∆
]
, drdλ = − rλ∆
(
εeL + 1−sσ
) (
1
cc
− 1lc
)
Consider then the system of differential equations in K and λ:
K˙(t) = l(K(t), λ(t))Af(x(t))e(K(t), l(K(t), λ(t)))− δK(t)− c(K(t), λ(t))
λ˙(t) = −λ(t) [r(K(t), λ(t))− ρ− δ]
Linearization around the NSS using (50) and the above results gives
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dK˙
dK = ρ− (δ+ρ)(1−s+εeL)s∆cc
(
εeK + sσ
)
+ εeK δ+ρs − δ(1−s)+ρs∆cl
(
εeK + sσ
)
dK˙
dλ =
K
λ∆
[
δ(1−s)+ρ
s
(
1
ll
+ εeL − sσ − 1cl
)
− (δ+ρ)(1−s+εeL)s
(
1
cc
− 1lc
)]
dλ˙
dK = − λK (δ + ρ)
[
εeK − (1−s)σ −
(
εeL +
(1−s)
σ
)
εeK+
s
σ
cc∆
]
dλ˙
dλ =
δ+ρ
∆
(
εeL +
(1−s)
σ
)(
1
cc
− 1lc
)
The expression of the characteristic polynomial follows after tedious com-
putations and straightforward simplifications based on Lemma 1.
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